Review or Rhetoric?  An Analysis of the United Nations Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review by Rana, Sameer
SIT Graduate Institute/SIT Study Abroad
SIT Digital Collections
Independent Study Project (ISP) Collection SIT Study Abroad
Fall 2015
Review or Rhetoric? An Analysis of the United
Nations Human Rights Council’s Universal
Periodic Review
Sameer Rana
SIT Graduate Institute - Study Abroad
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcollections.sit.edu/isp_collection
Part of the International Relations Commons, Peace and Conflict Studies Commons, and the
Politics and Social Change Commons
This Unpublished Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the SIT Study Abroad at SIT Digital Collections. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Independent Study Project (ISP) Collection by an authorized administrator of SIT Digital Collections. For more information, please
contact digitalcollections@sit.edu.
Recommended Citation
Rana, Sameer, "Review or Rhetoric? An Analysis of the United Nations Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review" (2015).
Independent Study Project (ISP) Collection. 2239.
https://digitalcollections.sit.edu/isp_collection/2239
1 
 
 
Review or Rhetoric?  
An Analysis of the United Nations Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review 
 
 
By Sameer Rana 
 
Fall 2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SIT Switzerland: International Studies and Multilateral Diplomacy 
Dr. Gyula Csurgai  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pomona College, Claremont, CA  
International Relations Major 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
Acknowledgements 
 
I would first and foremost like to express my immense gratitude to Mariette Grange, 
Senior Researcher at the Global Detention Project.  Since our very first email 
correspondence, she has shown me nothing but genuine kindness and absolute support.  It 
was her comment on the UPR set-up being a “silent revolution” that instigated my desire 
to conduct further research on the topic.  Additionally, she is the sole reason I was able to 
meet with and interview the following three incredibly pertinent, knowledgeable, and 
helpful individuals: Maria Francisca Ize-Charrin, Blaise Godet, and Peter Splinter.  On 
that note, I would also like to thank the three other professionals who allowed me to 
formally interview them: Ljiljana Stancic, Andrew Clapham, and Nicolas Agostini.  
These interactions were truly the most valuable aspects of my independent study project.   
 
At Pomona College, I would like to thank my IR advisor and favorite professor, Dr. Heidi 
Haddad, for instigating my initial interest in international human rights and global 
governance in general, and the UN Human Rights Council in specific last year.  Though 
she is many miles away, she has continued to help direct my focus and research this 
semester.   
 
Furthermore, I would like to acknowledge all the guidance I received from Dr. Gyula 
Csurgai, Dr Oksana Myshlovska, Dr. Heikki Mattila, Aline Dunant, and Christina Cornes 
during my time here in Switzerland.  I truly had a memorable academic and personal 
experience with the program.  In relation, I would also like to thank my incredible host 
mother, father, and brothers for accepting me into the family like one of their own.    
 
Last but definitely not least, I would like to thank my family and friends all around the 
world, including the lifelong ones I made on this program, for your constant support, 
encouragement, and love.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
Abstract 
 
Fifty, thirty, or even just twenty years ago, would one ever imagine a powerful 
country like the U.S., China, or Russia preparing a national report on the human rights 
situation in their country, then presenting it in front of a UN political body, engaging in 
dialogue, answering questions, and responding to recommendations from fellow Member 
States? This became a reality in 2006 when the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) 
replaced the problematic UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) and established a 
new and unprecedented mechanism known as the Universal Periodic Review (UPR).  
Under this instrument, the human rights records and situations of every single country in 
the world would be examined through a common procedure.  With its 1st cycle complete 
and 2nd cycle in progress until 2016, the UPR has displayed both its strengths and 
potential weaknesses.  These were examined through the presentation and analysis of 
numerous primary and secondary sources, as well as six formal interviews with 
extremely relevant professionals and experts.  Ultimately, it is primarily the responsibility 
of UN Member States to participate and cooperate with genuine political will, good faith, 
and belief in the process.  At the same time, the interaction of and between other 
stakeholders in the review is equally as important.  By outlining the transition from the 
Commission to the Council, the creation and functioning of the UPR, the primary 
achievements of and challenges to the universal mechanism and a few final thoughts, this 
research paper seeks to encourage discussion and critical thought into the significance of 
the peer and periodic review process and how it can be improved before the beginning of 
the 3rd cycle in order to achieve its stated objectives.  
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6 
Introduction 
 Since its creation in 1946, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights 
(UNCHR) served as a functional commission mandated under the Economic and Social 
Council (ECOSOC) to act as the UN’s principle mechanism and international forum 
concerned with the promotion and protection of human rights around the world.  Instead, 
this body was often criticized for its excessive politicization, selectivity, and double 
standards.  Therefore, in 2006, the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) was established 
to replace the Commission.   
 Though the transition from the Commission to the Council retained a large degree 
of continuity in terms of both criticisms levied against and working methods within the 
body, the Council did introduce an entirely new procedure: the Universal Periodic 
Review (UPR).  Under this mechanism, for the first time ever, the human rights records 
and situations of all UN Member States, regardless of size, wealth or political power, 
would be examined through a common process.  Accordingly, the UPR is regarded as the 
Council’s flagship procedure and one that is set up to solve some of the previous 
Commission’s most systematic and institutional issues.  It functions as a cooperative 
mechanism with a non-adversarial and interactive dialogue-centered approach, with a 
focus on promoting the universality, interdependence, and indivisibility of all human 
rights and the equal treatment of all States.   
 Though the UPR has its strengths, ranging from its universality and public 
documentation to the engagement between countries and involvement of different 
stakeholders, it also faces many challenges.  Critics slate the procedure for its 
superficiality, continued politicization, lack of punitive sanctions, and much more.  
7 
Ultimately, the UPR can succeed but only if these criticisms are addressed and 
governments participate and cooperate through genuine political will, good faith, and 
belief in the process.  Other stakeholders in the review play an extremely important role 
as well.   
 Examining the UPR is critical because its functioning impacts the perception of 
the reformed Council as a whole.  With its 1st cycle complete and 2nd cycle in progress 
until 2016, analyzing the primary strengths of and challenges to the procedure will shed 
some light on where it stands today and whether it will rise, or fall, tomorrow.  
Research Question and Purpose 
 The research questions ask: How was the new and unprecedented UPR set up to 
try and mitigate the issues of the Commission?   What are the mechanism’s primary 
strengths and weaknesses?  How can the Council, along with other stakeholders, improve 
the UPR’s efficiency and impact?     
 This paper is not an overly comprehensive analysis of the UPR.  Instead, it 
intends to encourage discussion on the procedure and serve as a concrete foundation for 
future research during my final year at Pomona College.   
Literature Review 
 The first set of secondary sources examines the transition from the Commission to 
the Council.  Here, I primarily use Paul Gordon Lauren’s publication, “The Journey from 
the Commission on Human Rights to the Human Rights Council,”1 which assesses the 
Commission’s beginnings, achievements, and criticisms and then analyzes how these 
factors affected the decision to replace it with the new Council in 2006.  Although the 
                                                 
1 Lauren, Paul Gordon. "To Preserve and Build on Its Achievements and to Redress Its Shortcomings": The 
Journey from the Commission on Human Rights to the Human Rights Council. Human Rights Quarterly 
29, no. 2, 307-345. Accessed October 10, 2015. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20072801. 
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Commission was supposed to be the world’s premier political forum in which to discuss 
human rights and confront governments over their violations, it had many issues: a small 
and underfunded staff; constrained time; problematic voting procedures for membership; 
an expansion of membership itself; and accusations of excessive politicization, 
selectivity, and double standards.  The Council aimed to solve or mitigate some of these 
issues by becoming a subsidiary organ to the UN General Assembly, increasing the 
duration of annual sessions, reforming voting procedures and requirements, reducing 
membership to forty-seven states, and introducing the UPR.   
 The second set of sources outlines the creation of the UPR and the tensions 
surrounding the discussions on how this mechanism would function in practice.  Here, I 
often refer to Allehone Mulugeta Abebe’s “Of Shaming and Bargaining: African States 
and the Universal Periodic Review of the United Nations Human Rights Council”2 and 
Rachel Brett’s “Neither Mountain nor Molehill, UN Human Rights Council: One Year 
On.”3  Abebe, an Ethiopian diplomat who participated in both the negotiations on the 
institution-building text of the Council and the first two sessions of the Working Group 
on UPR, explains how defining the procedures of the new review mechanism was a 
protracted matter and the subject of a great deal of debate and discussion.  He primarily 
highlights the use of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) as one possible model 
and the attempt by many African, and other developing, States to limit NGO and expert 
participation in the review process.  Similarly, Brett refers to the initial confusion on 
whether this mechanism would be “peer” or “periodic” and though “periodic” was 
                                                 
2 Abebe, A. M. "Of Shaming and Bargaining: African States and the Universal Periodic Review of the 
United Nations Human Rights Council." Human Rights Law Review 9, no. 1 (2009).  
 
3 Brett, Rachel. “Neither Mountain nor Molehill - UN Human Rights Council: One Year On.” Quaker 
United Nations Office, August 2007.  
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eventually adopted, many governments emphasized the peer-driven aspect of the 
procedure.  Both also highlight other key areas of disagreement and debate, which 
included the sources of information to be used, the role of different stakeholders, and so 
on.   
 The third set of sources helps analyze the primary strengths of and challenges to 
the UPR.  Since I used many of these articles and publications, I will primarily highlight 
one of them here: Emma Hickey’s “The UN’s Universal Periodic Review: Is it Adding 
Value and Improving the Human Rights situation on the Ground? A Critical Evaluation 
of the First Cycle and Recommendations for Reform.”4  This thesis critically evaluates 
the performance of the Council’s UPR process at the conclusion of its first cycle by 
analyzing the mechanism compared to its stated principles and objectives and 
establishing a firm framework from which to provide concrete recommendations for 
improvements to the system.  Hickey outlines the merit and sustainability of the UPR but 
also the difficult task of addressing its weaknesses.  I use this analysis, as well as those 
from other sources, to analyze the primary strengths of the UPR: universality; public 
documentation, catalyst, and accessibility; engagement between countries; and 
involvement of different stakeholders.  Then, I do the same in regards to the procedure’s 
weaknesses: superficiality; politicization; lack of punitive sanctions and surplus of empty 
rhetoric; recommendations; non-cooperation; and excessive focus on the Geneva round. 
The primary theoretical and analytical approach surrounds the study of international 
organizations and the use of peer-based initiatives to assess performance and adherence 
to shared norms.   
                                                 
4 Hickey, Emma. “The UN’s Universal Periodic Review: Is it Adding Value and Improving the Human 
Rights Situation on the Ground?”  ICL Journal.  
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Research Methodology and Analytical Framework 
 I formally interviewed the following six experts and professionals: Maria 
Francisca Ize-Charrin, former Secretary of the Commission from 1996-2001; Blaise 
Godet, former Swiss Ambassador to the UN in Geneva and Vice President of the 
Council’s First Cycle; Ljiljana Stancic, Human Rights Officer at the OHCHR HRC 
Branch; Andrew Clapham, Professor of Public International Law at the Graduate Institute 
of International and Development Studies in Geneva; Nicolas Agostini, International 
Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) Representative to the UN in Geneva; and Peter 
Splinter, Amnesty International (AI) Representative to the UN in Geneva.  I recruited 
these interviewees through the help of Mariette Grange (see Acknowledgements), the 
widespread network in Geneva, as well as extensive e-mail correspondence.  In terms of 
ethical considerations, I explained the importance of informed consent, specifically 
privacy, anonymity and confidentiality.  Each interviewee allowed me to record the 
interviews, take notes, and use their names in this research report.  
 In terms of other primary sources, I have read and analyzed UN resolutions and 
decisions, UPR State Reports, OHCHR compilations, stakeholder submissions, UPR 
recommendations, outcome reports, and other UN documents.  My secondary sources 
include various books, academic research papers and analyses accessed through online 
databases and journals, as well as NGO reports and other online articles.  These sets of 
data were divided into three general themes – the transition from the Commission to the 
Council, the creation and procedures of the UPR, and the primary strengths and 
weaknesses of the procedure – and then analyzed through a qualitative, historical, and 
institutional lens. 
11 
Transition from the Commission to the Council 
The UN Commission on Human Rights: Principal Criticisms  
In 1946, the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) established the UN 
Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR or the Commission) as a functional commission 
mandated to act as the UN’s principal mechanism and international forum concerned with 
the promotion and protection of human rights around the world.  Since the Commission 
met only once a year for a frenzied period of six weeks, it became extremely difficult to 
coordinate complex and multifaceted activities, especially since the staff was small and 
underfunded.5  This was further complicated as membership expanded from an original 
eighteen to a total of fifty-three.  Member States, based on their regions, only needed 
twenty-eight votes or a two-thirds majority in the ECOSOC to be elected for three-year 
terms.  Therefore, many states with extremely poor human rights records – such as 
Sudan, Sierra Leone, Uganda, Libya, Saudi Arabia, and Cuba – joined the Commission.  
Numerous members focused attention on the practices and problems of others, while 
ignoring their own or those of their allies.6  Additionally, smaller and less powerful states 
were easy targets for criticism and punishment.7  Amnesty International (AI) accused the 
body of routinely resorting to double standards, declaring that “membership is too often 
used to shield the Commission members from human rights scrutiny instead of to protect 
and promote human rights.8  In addition to grievances against double standards, the 
Commission was also consistently criticized for its excessive politicization and 
                                                 
5 Lauren, Paul Gordon. "To Preserve and Build on Its Achievements and to Redress Its Shortcomings": The 
Journey from the Commission on Human Rights to the Human Rights Council. Human Rights Quarterly 
29, no. 2, 326. Accessed October 10, 2015. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20072801. 
6 Ibid, 327.   
7 Ibid.  
8 Amnesty International. “2005 UN Commission on Human Rights: The UN’s chief guardian of human 
rights?” 2005, 1, available at https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/88000/ior410012005en.pdf. 
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selectivity, which were only heightened with the tangible presence of regional alliances, 
bloc voting, and the use of procedural devices to prevent debate on proposed action 
against certain countries and on controversial issues.9  Maria Francisca Ize-Charrin, 
Secretary of the Commission from 1996-2001, recounted these condemnations and 
concluded that, “This situation could not continue due to all the reasons mentioned.  
Something had to change…and this was a moment of change within the UN.  However, 
that was easy to say, difficult to create.”10  Understanding the criticisms levied against the 
Commission is vital because it helps explain why and how a new human rights body was 
created.  
High-level Panel and “Larger Freedom” Report  
 In its December 2004 report, a UN High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and 
Change called for an upgraded “Human Rights Council” which would no longer be 
subsidiary to the ECOSOC but would rather serve as a Charter body standing alongside it 
and the Security Council.11  Similarly, in his landmark March 2005 report, “In larger 
freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all,” then UN Secretary 
General Kofi Annan emphasized the urgent need for a new and improved human rights 
body.  He severely criticized the Commission, declaring that its “capacity to perform its 
tasks has been increasingly undermined by its declining credibility and 
professionalism…as a result, a credibility deficit has developed, which casts a shadow on 
                                                 
9 Abraham, Meghna. “A New Chapter for Human Rights: A handbook on issues of transition from the 
Commission on Human Rights to the Human Rights Council.” International Service for Human Rights and 
Freidrich-Ebert-Stiftun, June 2006, 11.  
10 Maria Francisca Ize-Charrin, Former Secretary of the UN Commission on Human Rights, interviewed by 
Author, October 27 2015, Geneva, Switzerland.  
11 United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and 
Change, “A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility,” 2004, 90, available at 
http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pdf/historical/hlp_more_secure_world.pdf 
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the reputation of the United Nations system as a whole.”12  Annan called UN Member 
States to place a strengthened pillar of human rights alongside those of security and 
development by agreeing to replace the Commission with a smaller standing Human 
Rights Council, whose members would “abide by the highest human rights standards.”13   
Establishment of the Human Rights Council and the Universal Periodic Review   
With Resolution 60/251 in March 2006, the UN General Assembly (GA) 
established the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC or the Council).  This new body 
would meet for at least three sessions of ten weeks or more throughout the year and 
would focus on fourteen country specific and thirty-nine thematic human rights issues.  In 
order to make the Council more representative and legitimate, it would serve as a 
subsidiary organ to the entire membership of the GA, rather than just the ECOSOC.  The 
Council’s size was decreased to forty-seven member states, the first time that the 
membership of any UN body has ever been reduced in order to achieve greater 
effectiveness.14  Seats would be geographically distributed, with thirteen for Africa, 
thirteen for Asia, eight for Latin America and the Caribbean, seven for the Western 
European and Others Group (WEOG), and six for Eastern Europe.  Voting would be 
carried out by secret ballot and states would require an absolute majority of the GA in 
order to be elected.  Members would serve for three-year periods and would not be 
eligible for immediate re-election after two consecutive terms.  Most importantly, the 
actual behavior and human rights records of governments would serve as the ultimate 
                                                 
12 United Nations, General Assembly, Report of the Secretary-General “In larger freedom: towards 
development, security and human rights for all,” A/59/2005, 21 March 2005, 45, available at 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/59/2005 
13 Ibid, 45-46.   
14 Lauren, “To Preserve and Built on Its Achievements and to Redress Its Shortcomings”: The Journey 
from the Commission on Human Rights to the Human Rights Council, 335. 
14 
criteria for membership.  This provision, never officially pronounced in the past, was 
designed to exclude the most serious human rights abusers.15  Those guilty of grave and 
systematic violations could have their membership revoked with a two-thirds majority 
vote in the GA.   
Though many of the working practices of the Council have remained largely 
similar to those of the Commission, Resolution 60/251 also introduced a new and 
unprecedented mechanism under which the human rights records and practices of every 
single UN Member State would be reviewed and scrutinized: the Universal Periodic 
Review (UPR).  This procedure was lauded as the Council’s most innovative and 
ambitious instrument because, unlike UN treaty bodies which could only scrutinize the 
human rights records of States that were Parties to the treaty, the UPR would be universal 
in nature, regardless of a country’s size, wealth, or influence.16  By establishing a review 
of the human rights records of every UN Member State, it was hoped that the persistent 
criticisms of selectivity, politicization, and double standards that had plagued the 
Commission could be alleviated.17 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
15 Lauren, “To Preserve and Built on Its Achievements and to Redress Its Shortcomings”: The Journey 
from the Commission on Human Rights to the Human Rights Council, 336.  
16 Ghanea, Nazila. "From UN Commission on Human Rights to UN Human Rights Council: One Step 
Forwards or Two Steps Sideways?" ICLQ International & Comparative Law Quarterly 55, no. 3 (2006): 
704. Accessed October 2, 2015. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4092647. 
17 Hickey, Emma. “The UN’s Universal Periodic Review: Is it Adding Value and Improving the Human 
Rights Situation on the Ground?”  ICL Journal: 1.  
15 
Creation of the UPR 
From CHR Mechanism to Resolution 60/251   
 The idea of monitoring human rights implementation through review of periodic 
reports was first established, at the Commission’s initiative, in 1956 by an ECOSOC 
Resolution that requested states to submit reports on progress every three years.18  
However, with the proliferation of international human rights treaties that included 
reporting requirements themselves, the review of periodic reports was deemed 
progressively obsolete and was formally abolished by GA Resolution 35/209 in 
December 1980.19 
 The idea of the UPR itself is often credited to Walter Kälin, a Swiss legal scholar 
and professor who published a paper on the topic.20  However, it was Secretary-General 
Kofi Annan who, in an April 2005 address to the Commission’s final session, reasoned 
that the Council “should have an explicitly defined function as a chamber of peer review.  
Its main task would be to evaluate the fulfillment by all states of all their human rights 
obligations...under such a system, every Member State could come up for review on a 
periodic basis.”21   Initially, WEOG Member States, along with a few large non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), were against the idea of a universal review process, 
instead preferring to preserve the strength of country-specific resolutions.22  However, 
proponents of the UPR argued that, for the sake of the Council’s credibility, there would 
                                                 
18 Alston, Philip. "Reconceiving the UN Human Rights Regime: Challenges Confronting the New UN 
Human Rights Council." Melbourne Journal of International Law 7 (2006).  
19 Ibid.   
20 Peter Splinter, Amnesty International Representative to the UN in Geneva, interviewed by Author, 
November 2 2015, Geneva, Switzerland.    
21 Secretary General Kofi Annan’s Address to the Commission on Human Rights, 7 April 2005, available at 
http://www.un.org/sg/STATEMENTS/index.asp?nid=1388 
22 Peter Splinter, Amnesty International Representative to the UN in Geneva, interviewed by Author, 
November 2 2015, Geneva, Switzerland.    
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need to be some sort of mechanism to ensure that every country’s record would be 
reviewed.23  That same year, Canada circulated two non-papers on Peer Review: the first 
offering two approaches for the review – a Comprehensive Approach and the Interactive 
Dialogue – and the second combining the two approaches.24  The Comprehensive 
Approach comprised of compiling a wide-ranging state report, giving recommendations, 
a formal interactive dialogue, and publication of conclusions.25  The Interactive Dialogue 
proposed a three-hour discussion of a state’s pre-published statement on its national 
human rights situation, with extra information made available by the Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR).26  As would be seen later, Canada’s 
proposals effectively guided and shaped the subsequent UPR process.  There were also 
conceptions of the review offered by Mexico and Switzerland, though they varied 
significantly from their Canadian counterpart’s.27 
 Reflecting Annan’s vision, GA Resolution 60/251 established the UPR’s general 
outline.  Paragraph 5(e) states that the Council shall:  
“Undertake a universal periodic review, based on objective and reliable 
information, of the fulfillment by each State of its human rights obligations and 
commitments in a manner which ensures universality of coverage and equal 
treatment with respect to all States; the review shall be a cooperative mechanism, 
based on an interactive dialogue, with the full involvement of the country 
concerned and with consideration given to its capacity-building needs; such a 
                                                 
23 Peter Splinter, Amnesty International Representative to the UN in Geneva, interviewed by Author, 
November 2 2015, Geneva, Switzerland.    
24 Gaer, F. D. "A Voice Not an Echo: Universal Periodic Review and the UN Treaty Body System." Human 
Rights Law Review 7, no. 1 (2007): 114. 
25 Ibid.  
26 Ibid.  
27 Peter Splinter, Amnesty International Representative to the UN in Geneva, interviewed by Author, 
November 2 2015, Geneva, Switzerland.    
17 
mechanism shall complement and not duplicate the work of treaty bodies; the 
Council shall develop the modalities and necessary time allocation for the 
universal periodic review mechanism within one year after the holding of its first 
session”28 
UPR Tensions during Institution Building Stage   
 During its first session, the Council established an open-ended Working Group 
(WG) to determine the UPR’s modalities.29  Defining the procedures of the new review 
mechanism was a protracted matter and the subject of a great deal of debate and 
discussion.30  During these negotiations, the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) 
was regarded as one possible model.31  There was some initial confusion as to whether 
this mechanism would be based on “peer” or “periodic” review.32  Though the term 
“periodic” was adopted, many governments persisted that it should still be a review by 
peers and wished to minimize or exclude NGO and expert involvement.33  This was 
despite the active participation of NGOs during the WG.34  Some other key areas of 
disagreement and debate included: the sources of information to be used; the composition 
of the WG facilitating the review; the role of the Troika, OHCHR, special rapporteurs 
and other stakeholders; and many other concerns such as who would lead discussions, 
who could intervene, and how recommendations should be framed.35  These complex 
                                                 
28 General Assembly, “Human Rights Council,” A/RES/60/251, 3 April 2006. 
29 Human Rights Council, A/HRC/Resolution/1/103.   
30 Abebe, A. M. "Of Shaming and Bargaining: African States and the Universal Periodic Review of the 
United Nations Human Rights Council." Human Rights Law Review 9, no. 1 (2009): 4. 
31 Ibid.  
32 Brett, Rachel. “Neither Mountain nor Molehill - UN Human Rights Council: One Year On.” Quaker 
United Nations Office, August 2007, 6.  
33 Ibid.  
34 Peter Splinter, Amnesty International Representative to the UN in Geneva, interviewed by Author, 
November 2 2015, Geneva, Switzerland.    
35 Ibid.     
18 
tensions and lengthy deliberations eventually helped shape the UPR into what it is today.  
Ultimately, consensus on the mechanism’s modalities enshrined in the June 2007 GA 
Resolution 5/1, or the Institution Building Package (IBP), was easily achieved, as the 
UPR’s firm establishment was recognized by all those involved as key for the Council’s 
credibility and success.36 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
36 Sweeney, G., and Y. Saito. "An NGO Assessment of the New Mechanisms of the UN Human Rights 
Council." Human Rights Law Review 9, no. 2 (2009): 205. 
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Council Resolution 5/1: How the UPR Works 
 Council Resolution 5/1’s section on the UPR contains details on the basis, 
principles, objectives, periodicity, general order, documentation, modalities, outcome, 
and follow-up of the review.37  Placed here are the review’s basis, principles and 
objectives, as they are critical to consider while analyzing the procedure as a whole.   
Basis of the Review 
The basis of the review is: the Charter of the United Nations; the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights; Human Rights instruments to which a State is party; 
Voluntary pledges and commitments made by States, including those undertaken when 
presenting their candidatures for election to the Human Rights Council; and applicable 
international humanitarian law.  
Principles  
The universal periodic review should:  
1. Promote the universality, interdependence, indivisibility and interrelatedness of 
all human rights 
2. Be a cooperative mechanism based on objective and reliable information and on 
interactive dialogue 
3. Ensure universal coverage and equal treatment of all States 
4. Be an intergovernmental process, UN Member-driven and action oriented 
5. Fully involve the country under review 
6. Complement and not duplicate other human rights mechanisms, thus representing 
an added value 
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7. Be conducted in an objective, transparent, non-selective, constructive, non-
confrontational and non-politicized manner 
8. Not be overly burdensome to the concerned State or to the agenda of the HRC 
9. Not be overly long; it should be realistic and not absorb a disproportionate 
amount of time or human and financial resources 
10. Not diminish the HRC’s capacity to respond to urgent human rights situations 
11.  Fully integrate a gender perspective 
12. Take into account the level of development and specificities of countries 
13. Ensure the participation of all relevant stakeholders, including non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) and national human right institutions (NHRIs). 
Objectives 
The objectives of the review are:  
1. he improvement of the human rights situation on the ground 
2. The fulfillment of the State’s human rights obligations and commitments and 
assessment of positive developments and challenges faced by the State 
3. The enhancement of the State’s capacity and of technical assistance, in 
consultation with, and with the consent of, the State concerned 
4. The sharing of best practice among States and other stakeholders 
5. Support for cooperation in the promotion and protection of human rights 
6. The encouragement of full cooperation and engagement with the HRC, other 
human rights bodies and the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human 
Rights (OHCHR).   
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Procedure 
 In the interest of limited space and the purposes of this research paper, the lengthy 
UPR process will be illustrated through the diagram below.38   This diagram does not 
explain each aspect of the process in detail but does illustrate the key ones in order to 
paint a general picture of how the mechanism functions.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
38 Available at http://co-guide.org/mechanism/universal-periodic-review-upr 
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Analyzing the UPR 
 A central contemporary challenge facing the international community, especially 
standards-based intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) is how to promote both a vision 
of and adherence to commonly agreed-on norms.39  This has become an increasingly 
important question with the expansion of globalization and the growth and impact of 
IGOs working in fields such as human rights. One method, which in recent years has 
been adopted by a few organizations and which has begun to attract increased attention 
more broadly, is the development of peer-based initiatives to assess performance and 
make recommendations on improving adherence to shared norms.40  Notable but 
significantly differing examples include the Development Assistance Committee peer 
review process of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), the previously mentioned APRM of the African Union (AU), and the Council’s 
UPR process.  Examining the UPR, which is unlike any other mechanism in the UN 
human rights system, is critical because how it functions and how it is perceived 
considerably impacts the functioning and perception of the Council as a whole.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
39 McMahon, Edward.  “Herding Cats and Sheep: Assessing State and Regional Behavior in the Universal 
Periodic Review Mechanism of the United Nations Human Rights Council.”  University of Vermont, July 
2010: 3.  
40 Ibid. 
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Primary Strengths of the UPR 
Universality  
 The principal strength of the UPR undoubtedly lies in its universality.  In the 
Commission, many countries felt that standing agenda items did not provide equal 
attention to all UN Member States.41  On the other hand, treaty bodies could only address 
specific issues and special rapporteurs could only visit countries that agreed to invite 
them.  Therefore, human rights situations, however grave, in some countries garnered 
little to no discussion for years.  It became an informal custom to place more attention on 
regions traditionally associated with human rights challenges, thus neglecting the 
challenges facing countries with supposedly high human rights standards.42  This 
ultimately led to complaints of selectivity and double standards, especially from the 
States and regions being criticized regularly.  Before the UPR was established, it was 
difficult to imagine the human rights situations of powerful countries under public or peer 
scrutiny.  Through the universal mechanism, the Council has examined country situations 
that are rarely spotlighted in international forums, and has also shed light on human rights 
concerns in states with generally strong human rights performance where such issues 
would otherwise have been overlooked.43  While the mechanism’s functional value in 
examining all human rights issues in each and every State is apparent, it is also powerful 
symbolically.  The UPR validates the idea that human rights is a legitimate matter of 
concern for the international community and cannot be covered by the veil of national 
                                                 
41 UPR Info, “A Guide for Recommending States at the UPR,” 6, available at http://www.upr-
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42 UPR Info, “Analytical Assessment of The Universal Periodic Review 2008-2010,” 10, available at 
http://www.upr-info.org/sites/default/files/general-document/pdf/upr-
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43 Human Rights Watch, “Curing the Selectivity Syndrome: The 2011 Review of the Human Rights 
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sovereignty.44   It also conveys the message that human rights belong to everybody, and 
that each government is accountable.45  Lastly, according to Blaise Godet, former Swiss 
Ambassador to the UN in Geneva and Vice President of the Council’s First Cycle, “Most 
countries have understood that human rights is a necessary dimension in international 
relations.  It is a fact of life.  It is not a dirty word.  It is something that every country has 
to face, respect, implement, and improve.”46 
Public Documentation, Catalyst, and Accessibility  
 Besides the twenty-page national report prepared by the State under review (SuR), 
the OHCHR also prepares a ten-page compilation of UN information (including Special 
Procedures reports, human rights treaty body reports, and other relevant UN 
documentation) as well as another ten-page summary of information received from civil 
society stakeholders such as National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs) and NGOs. 
Andrew Clapham, Professor of Public International Law at the Graduate Institute of 
International and Development Studies in Geneva, commented, “There are documents, 
official and NGO, for every single State which you can look up online.  We now have a 
concrete evaluation of every state’s human rights records and what needs to be 
done…and that is very valuable”47  
 In this way, the UPR serves as a genuine catalyst for other instruments in the UN 
human rights protection system, including the Treaty Bodies and Special Procedures.  It 
brings together the knowledge and information of these systems, and strengthens their 
                                                 
44 Nicolas Agostini, International Federation for Human Rights Representative to the UN in Geneva, 
interviewed by Author, October 30 2015, Geneva, Switzerland.  
45 Peter Splinter, Amnesty International Representative to the UN in Geneva, interviewed by Author, 
November 2 2015, Geneva, Switzerland.    
46 Blaise Godet, former Swiss Ambassador to the UN in Geneva and Vice President of the UN Human 
Rights Council’s First Cycle, interviewed by Author, October 30 2015, Geneva, Switzerland.  
47 Andrew Clapham, Professor of Public International Law at the Graduate Institute of International and 
Development Studies in Geneva, interviewed by Author, October 15 2015, Geneva, Switzerland.   
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observations and proposals by providing them with a global tribune and, in many cases, 
by including them in the recommendations issued to the SuR.48 Being a policy plus 
practice model, the interrelatedness of the UPR with these other mechanisms reinforces 
and strengthens the work of the Council and the broader UN human rights system.49  
Another positive aspect of the UPR is its accessibility through public webcast on 
the OHCHR’s website, and the fact that it is recorded and can be viewed at any time, 
therefore making the entire process more transparent.50  Besides the secretariat’s 
resources online, there are also NGOs such as UPR Info that maintain open databases and 
statistics on all UPR recommendations and voluntary pledges across several categories, 
as well as links to key UPR documents and analyses. 
Engagement between Countries   
 One of the main sources of success for the UPR is the fact that it is a shared 
experience for governments in which all States both make and receive recommendations 
from their peers.51  Precisely because the process is political and peer-driven, 
recommendations delivered by other States can carry more weight than those delivered 
by experts, mechanisms, or similar bodies.52  Additionally, States that normally may not 
engage in discussion with each other are able to do so within this forum.  Ljiljana Stancic, 
Human Rights Officer in the Council Branch of the OHCHR agreed that “the sheer 
magnitude of engagement of countries with one another is a very good by-product of this 
                                                 
48 Hickey, “The UN’s Universal Periodic Review: Is it Adding Value and Improving the Human Rights 
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49 UPR Info, “Analytical Assessment of The Universal Periodic Review 2008-2010,” 10, available at 
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50 Human Rights Watch, “Curing the Selectivity Syndrome,” 12-13.  
51 Human Rights Watch, “Curing the Selectivity Syndrome,” 12.  
52 Nicolas Agostini, International Federation for Human Rights Representative to the UN in Geneva, 
interviewed by Author, October 30 2015, Geneva, Switzerland.  
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process…even the big countries are forced to think about the issues and problems of their 
less powerful counterparts, listen to them, and provide recommendations…and vice 
versa.”53  A positive element that could develop from such engagement is, for example, 
bilateral assistance agreements or programs between developed and developing nations.   
Involvement of Different Stakeholders: OHCHR and NGOs  
 In addition to documentation and public webcasting, the OHCHR supports the 
UPR process in numerous ways.  The Office, with separate branches for both the Council 
and the UPR, also develops training modules, briefs States and other stakeholders on the 
mechanism, provides technical assistance to strengthen national processes to engage with 
the UPR and other human rights mechanisms, as well as support to follow-up on 
recommendations.54  The secretariat serves as institutional memory for the Council and 
an impartial international civil service to provide advice and guidance to governments on 
procedures, rules and regulations.55  For example, the Office supports the troika56 in the 
performance of their role and helps prepare the outcome report for the troika’s and 
reviewed state’s approval.  Most importantly, since the UPR is so political, the OHCHR 
functions to safeguard and facilitate the entire process.57  
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 Civil society, specifically NGOs, also play a vital role.  The UPR has provided a 
valuable platform for these stakeholders to engage with a wide range of relevant actors on 
pressing human rights issues.  Firstly, States are encouraged to conduct broad 
consultations with NGOs and other civil society stakeholders at the national level in the 
preparation of their report.  According to Peter Splinter, Amnesty International’s 
Representative to the UN in Geneva, the argument behind this was that “if the UPR is 
going to be successful, it has to include the broader society, not just the national 
ministry…now, more than a majority of nations have some kind of consultations with 
larger civil society.”58  Secondly, NGOs can forward joint or individual reports on the 
SuR’s human rights situation to the OHCHR summary.  Though they do not actively 
participate in the WG review, NGOs can observe the session, organize parallel or side 
events, provide briefings, advocate and lobby governments, and make oral statements on 
the floor during the consideration and adoption of reports in the Council plenary session.   
 The UPR presents unprecedented advocacy opportunities at the international and 
national level for human rights supporters seeking to spotlight concerns and push for 
change.59  At the international or institutional level, various States have displayed 
openness in listening to the concerns of NGOs and NHRIs, and echoing them by 
formulating related questions and recommendations to the SuR.60 At the national level, 
there has also been a greater willingness among relevant national state actors to initiate or 
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continue dialogue or cooperation with civil society on contentious human rights issues.61  
Lastly, though States are primarily responsible for implementing their accepted UPR 
recommendations, NGOs play an important role in monitoring and following up on the 
process.  According to Nicolas Agostini, Representative of the International Federation 
for Human Rights (FIDH) to the UN in Geneva, while accepted recommendations are 
evidently useful, even “those that have not been accepted provide NGOs like us with a 
certain advocacy value…especially when there are a large number of recommendations 
on a specific issue.”62  Though the role of civil society is limited, due to previously 
mentioned State emphasis on the peer-led aspect of this process, the UPR certainly 
provides a more institutionalized and bottom-up avenue to engage with national 
governments and facilitate the realization, promotion, and protection of widespread 
international human rights.  
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The Primary Challenges to the UPR 
Superficiality  
 Given that the duration of the review for each country in the WG was three hours 
during the first cycle and is now three and a half hours during the second cycle, many 
have criticized the superficial nature of the UPR.  In this time, it is impossible to address 
all the human rights issues within a country, especially considering the amount of 
information that goes into a review.  However, the UPR’s WG session is a political and 
discussion-based process and is not meant to serve as a rigorous technical review of 
States’ human rights records and situations.  As implied in its principles, the review must 
complement and help enforce, rather than compete with or replace, recommendations 
from other more expert-led and detail-oriented human rights mechanisms such as treaty 
bodies and Special Procedures.   
Politicization  
 Since the UPR interactive dialogue is primarily conducted on an 
intergovernmental basis, there is a tangible danger that the process becomes overly 
politicized.  In a number of cases, governments have been able to avoid critical 
assessments by rallying the support of “friends” eager to praise their human rights record 
without devoting any attention to the shortcomings that exist regarding human rights in 
all States.63  For example, for its first cycle, Iran lobbied and rallied friendly nations not 
particularly known for their respect for human rights - such as Sudan, China, Cuba, Syria, 
and Zimbabwe - to provide a counterpoint to the criticisms they were facing.64  Similarly, 
Venezuela was accused of manipulating its list of speakers by rallying allied states before 
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the WG, resulting in the monopolization of speaking time and the exclusion of more 
pertinent recommendations.65  This practice, informally known as “stacking the 
audience,” undermines the UPR’s principle of transparency and objectivity, as well as its 
goal of engendering meaningful discussion around human rights records and situations.   
Furthermore, States belonging to the same or similar regional groupings rarely 
criticize each other.  For example, out of the 65 statements made during the first review 
of Tunisia, at a time when it was facing numerous human rights challenges, 50 of them 
were “favorable” and came mainly from African and Muslim countries.66  This sort of 
regional leniency has become apparent because “if you look at the general 
recommendations made by, for example, EU member states to other EU member states or 
African countries to other African countries, they are quite weak.  What seems to be the 
general thrust is that proximity leads to softness as opposed to rigor.”67  Correspondingly, 
members of the 57-strong Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) have also 
largely followed the trend of praising each other’s records.68 
 Devolving into a mutual admiration or praise society serves as a looming danger 
to the UPR process.  Within this context, States hope that the positive comments they 
make, whether warranted or not, about others will be echoed in return when they 
themselves face review.  This is especially true for like-minded states with significant 
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political, policy or other affinities and interests in common.69 A Geneva-based NGO, UN 
Watch, claims that in the first cycle of the UPR, a majority of 32 out of 55 countries acted 
as a mutual praise society, misusing the process in order to legitimize human rights 
abusers, instead of holding them to account.70  It considers 19 of these countries as 
“destructive” i.e. States that specifically praised, legitimized and encouraged country 
policies and practices that violate human rights.71  In a scathing criticism of the process, a 
joint NGO Statement during the Council’s eighth session read:  
“On the UPR Working Group, we note the value of a cooperative approach but 
express serious concern at the practice of some States which have been lining up 
only to praise their allies. This approach runs contrary to the agreed principle that 
the UPR should be conducted in an ‘objective, transparent, non-selective, 
constructive, non-confrontational and non- politicized manner’. In this sense, the 
UPR has not lived up to the expectations of a move away from the ‘politicisation’ 
of the past. Indeed, in many cases, this ‘politicisation’ has seemed more 
pronounced than ever. In several instances information provided by states under 
review, or by those praising them, has been misleading at best.”72 
Undoubtedly, these trends are worrying and do undermine the principal principles 
and objectives of the UPR.  However, given the immensely political dimensions of 
human rights, as well as the political nature of the Council and the intergovernmental 
UPR process itself, criticisms of “politicization” are rather unhelpful.  In an April 2003 
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statement to the fifty-ninth Session of the Commission, Sérgio Vieira de Mello, former 
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, noted: “Most of the people in this room work 
for governments or seek to affect the actions of governments.  That is politics.  For some 
to accuse others of being political is a bit like fish criticizing one another for being wet.  
The accusation hardly means anything anymore.”73  The practices of stacking the 
audience, regional leniency, and mutual praise among like-minded States are not 
surprising given the sizeable political umbrella under which they operate.  The long-term 
success of the UPR will depend on the ability of States to establish a norm of critiquing at 
least aspects of fellow member states’ human rights situations without engendering 
counterclaims of disloyalty or lack of cooperation.74  Ultimately, it is the responsibility of 
civil society, media, and most importantly, States themselves, to ensure that this process, 
however politicized it may be, remains meaningful and contributes to the concrete 
improvement of human rights situations on the ground. 
Lack of Punitive Sanctions and Surplus of Empty Rhetoric   
 Like many mechanisms within the UN system, the UPR lacks punitive sanctions 
in cases of non-compliance or non-implementation.  The recommendations are non-
binding and after the discussions and reports in Geneva, the SuR is free to implement 
what it sees fit.  Though countries must report back on progress, either through voluntary 
mid-term reports or updates during their second and subsequent cycles of review, there 
are few ramifications for inadequate compliance.  Rather, the UPR operates as a 
cooperative and dialogue-centered mechanism that is non-adversarial in nature.  Due to 
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this fact, “there is an inherent danger of this mechanism just becoming a talking 
shop…but this is how it works in politics.”75  While this danger of the UPR becoming 
just a talking shop has always existed and will continue to do so, there are potential 
safeguards.   
 Ultimately, as with the aspects of politicization, it is the responsibility of civil 
society, the OHCHR, special rapporteurs, and other stakeholders to prevent this from 
establishing itself into the working culture of the Council.  At the same time, when 
detractors complain about the lack of enforcement or punishment mechanisms, they 
suggest in a way that there is some way to apply these.  However, critically thinking, 
“What would that enforcement mechanism do?  Clearly the Council cannot use 
force…and sanctions are not very useful instruments here…so what are we left with?  
Some sort of dialogue and cooperation, which is what the Council has with the UPR.”76   
Peer reviews, like the UPR, have become one of the most widely used “soft 
instruments” of global governance and function primarily as tools for international 
cooperation that respect sovereignty and diversity.77  While some dismiss these types of 
instruments, regulatory scholarship suggests that peer review of the kind undertaken by 
the UPR can be effective in some circumstances, which is certainly better than nothing.78  
It has been argued that although states may initially participate in cooperative regulatory 
regimes in a perfunctory manner, or for reasons at odds with stated purposes, they are 
frequently drawn into more meaningful commitments simply through their 
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representatives’ embodied experience of participation and their desire to earn the esteem 
and respect of their peers.79  Arguably, this can be seen at the UPR, as States often 
announce human rights initiatives prior to their review and multiple mission staffs in 
Geneva display a marked willingness to engage with other diplomats and civil society 
throughout the review process.80  Lastly, one must consider that a number of States do 
participate in genuinely good faith during the UPR.   
Recommendations 
 While an entire research paper could be devoted to analyzing, both qualitatively 
and quantitatively, the type of recommendations made and accepted by States during the 
UPR, this section seeks to highlight some of the core challenges concerning this central 
aspect of the review process.  Firstly, recommendations are made and ascribed 
individually to the State making them, without any attempt to produce agreed 
recommendations, and without any quality control on wording or substance.81  Secondly, 
there seems to be “a trend of a certain number of countries making recommendations that 
are vague, not measurable, and that ultimately are not relevant in terms of pushing for 
human rights reform at the national level.”82  For example, in session 3, Ghana vaguely 
recommended Botswana to “seek contributions from the international community in the 
Government’s efforts to promote rights.”  Imprecise recommendations are 
counterproductive and make monitoring implementation and follow-up impossible.  
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FIDH deplores that it is these types of recommendations that are the most accepted by the 
SuR because they involve little to no action in terms of policy, legislative, or other 
societal changes at the national level.83  Similarly, in March 2015, a group of 47 NGOs 
released a statement maintaining that it is not the number of high recommendations that 
challenges the UPR but argue rather that “weak and vague recommendations are the 
issue…what really undermines the promotion of human rights is the sole acceptance by 
some states of the least binding recommendations.”84   Additionally, the SuR can choose 
which recommendations to accept, which to give further consideration to, and which to 
note.  “Noted” recommendations are, in other words, rejected.  Most importantly, SuRs 
are not obliged to explain or justify why a recommendation is noted, which is unfortunate 
considering that these recommendations are most likely the ones to make tangible 
differences in practice.  Rather, only recommendations distinctly accepted by the SuR can 
be monitored within the formal process.   
 The quality and quantity of accepted and noted recommendations reflects the 
view of many States that reform through the UPR must be largely evolutionary, rather 
than revolutionary.85  Even so, States must be encouraged to make SMART - Specific, 
Measurable, Achievable, Relevant, and Time-Bound – recommendations.86  Furthermore, 
though unlikely to happen in the near future, States should also be obliged to provide 
reasons for their rejection of recommendations, especially if numerous recommending 
States repeat a certain “noted” recommendation. 
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Non-Cooperation  
  As mentioned before, the principal strength of the UPR lies in its universality. 
Therefore, the entire exercise is in danger if even one State decides not to or fails to 
cooperate.  The only attempt to deal with this is vaguely described in Article 38 of 
Resolution 5/1 which states, “After exhausting all efforts to encourage a State to 
cooperate with the universal periodic review mechanism, the Council will address, as 
appropriate, cases of persistent non-cooperation with the mechanism.”   
The most significant testing point of this hazard was in March 2012 when Israel’s 
foreign minister severed all working relations with the Council and the OHCHR due to 
the perceived selectivity and disproportionate bias of the Council against the Jewish 
State.87  This confirmed Israel’s likely non-participation in their January 2013 UPR, 
which would make it the first country to miss a scheduled review for reasons other than a 
domestic urgency.88  Echoing concerns from many in civil society, AI criticized this 
decision by reasoning that, “ The UPR stands to lose the compelling legitimacy it derives 
from being applied even-handedly to all...why should states that would prefer to escape 
scrutiny…or are severely resource constrained submit to this process if Israel’s non-
compliance demonstrates that it is no longer universal?”89  Ultimately, the Council voiced 
regret at Israel’s decision, postponed the country’s examination to later that year, and 
called on the President of the Council to “take all appropriate” steps to encourage Israel 
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to resume its cooperation.90  Israel eventually returned to the Council for its rescheduled 
second review in October 2013, albeit with strong reservations.   
While Israel’s non-cooperation was the biggest political challenge to universality, 
there are also many practical and logistical difficulties of participation for many 
developing states.  A frequently cited criticism of the UPR has been that smaller and less 
developed countries do not have adequate resources to sufficiently prepare for and 
participate in the process.91  In the first cycle, many of these states submitted extremely 
scant national reports while some countries, such as Cape Verde, did not submit a report 
at all.  Understandably, it is also extremely difficult for these states to bring experts or 
high-level national representatives to Geneva multiple times a year, let alone deal with 
the implementation of countless recommendations.   
Concerning the political challenge to universality, one must remember that a 
State’s participation in the UPR is completely voluntary.  In the early stages of the first 
cycle, if a solitary State or group of States decided not to participate for political reasons, 
it might have led to the total downfall of the procedure.  However, this was not the case 
and besides Israel’s challenge in 2013, there have not been many critical situations of 
non-cooperation or participation due to political reasons.  Rather, the practical and 
logistical difficulties of participation and cooperation, with the UPR in specific and the 
Council in general, have been and are much more acute.  In response, the OHCHR, in 
addition to already providing a range of advisory services and technical assistance, has 
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http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=44026#.VjtcbMru5pk. 
91 Hickey, “The UN’s Universal Periodic Review: Is it Adding Value and Improving the Human Rights 
Situation on the Ground?” 16.  
 
38 
established resources such as the Voluntary Technical Assistance Trust Fund to Support 
the Participation of Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and Small Island Developing 
States (SIDS) in the work of the Human Rights Council (HRC) and the Voluntary Fund 
for Financial and Technical Assistance for the Implementation of the Universal Periodic 
Review.  States, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, or private 
institutions and individuals must make contributions voluntarily.  Predictably, the 
OHCHR is struggling to secure financial commitments from donors, forcing it to 
prioritize requests and therefore considerably limit coverage.92   
Excessive Focus on Geneva Round   
Though many focus on the Geneva round of the UPR, what happens in the 
“Capital of Peace” is sandwiched between two rounds that occur in the SuRs themselves 
– consultations and documentation beforehand and implementation and follow-up after.  
Though the process in Geneva serves as an important tool and catalyst, perhaps what is 
much more important is what happens in-country for preparation and what happens in-
country afterwards.93  While the interactive dialogue, exchange of recommendations, and 
so on are valuable components of the process, what ultimately matters the most in reality 
is the national implementation of recommendations and the tangible improvement of 
human rights situations on the ground.   
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93 Peter Splinter, Amnesty International Representative to the UN in Geneva, interviewed by Author, 
November 2 2015, Geneva, Switzerland.    
39 
Conclusion 
 It is highly unlikely that the shortcomings of the UPR or the Council are going to 
be addressed through structural and procedural reform in the short term, and whatever 
changes do occur, for better or worse, will come out of practice.94  It is thus the 
responsibility of, first and foremost, UN Member States to participate and cooperate with 
genuine political will and good faith, from the documentation to the implementation stage 
and everything in between.  The interaction of and amongst OHCHR, national and 
international civil society, scholars, and other stakeholders in the process will play an 
increasingly important role in determining the effectiveness of the procedure, both in and 
out of Geneva.  Ultimately, the UPR is a compromise, born out of the need to have a 
meaningful instrument to promote universal human rights norms while respecting the 
reality of a consensus-based decision-making process.95  As mentioned before, it is 
largely evolutionary rather than revolutionary in nature.  However, the sheer existence 
and functioning of such a mechanism undoubtedly lends both legitimacy and added value 
to the reformed Council.  Therefore, it should not be taken for granted. Rather, it should 
be nurtured with the understanding that all states – developed and developing, North and 
South, East and West – face human rights challenges, but that these situations can be 
addressed and improved through collaboration between all those involved.  Only then can 
we inch one step closer towards Kofi Annan’s vision of development, security, and 
human rights for all.   
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Potential Future Research  
 As mentioned in the introduction, I am seeking to build on this research and 
analysis for my final year thesis at Pomona College.  As the UPR’s second cycle nears its 
conclusion, I could advance in numerous different ways.  The following are a few: 
 Analyze recommendations by collecting data on the overall number of 
recommendations, recommendations by action category, SuR responses to 
recommendations, SuR responses by action category, recommendations and SuR 
responses by action category and region, and breakdown of recommendations by 
issue and region to conclude if any patterns or trends emerge from the data. 
 Conduct case studies, perhaps one country from each UN regional group, to 
examine national level measures before and after the UPR process in Geneva.  
 Critically compare and contrast the UPR to the OECD or AU peer review 
mechanisms.  
 Analyze the UPR in the broader context of the Council, along with Special 
Procedures, Treaty bodies and so on, keeping in mind that the UPR cannot 
directly respond to immediate human rights violations and concerns on the 
ground.  
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